This paper examines open market share repurchases in Canada (called Normal Course Issuer Bids-NCIB). Similar to announcements of U.S. open market share repurchases, announcements of Canadian NCIBs are accompanied by a positive stock price reaction. If NCIBs signal information, then it is not in the same manner as U.S. repurchases. Canadian firms usually announce the legal maximum proportion of shares that they are entitled to repurchase rather than a target proportion as in the U.S. Thus, the signal in Canada is the announcement of the NCIB, not the target proportion. We use a conditional event study methodology to account for the discrete nature of the signal and potential endogeneity of the announcement. As an alternative to signaling, we examine whether NCIBs are used by shareholders as a means of reducing financial slack and thereby reducing the costs of agency conflicts. Our test fails to reject either the signaling hypothesis or the agency conflict hypothesis.
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The increase in popularity of open market share repurchases in the U.S. is well documented by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) The finance literature has provided many explanations for why firms engage in open market repurchases: personal and corporate tax minimization, indirect insider trading, substitute to cash dividends, mitigation of principal-agent conflicts, and information signaling. The dominant explanation that has emerged from studies by Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1981) , Ofer and Thakor (1987) , Comment and Jarrell (1991), and McNally (1999) , is that insiders use open market repurchases to signal their private information about the firm's favorable future prospects. The existing repurchase literature is based exclusively on U.S. evidence. It is not clear how easily these U.S. results can be generalized to other jurisdictions. International evidence on repurchases is required to explore the robustness of various hypotheses.
In this paper we examine open market share repurchases, called Normal Course Issuer Bids in Canada (NCIBs), by firms listed on the TSE. We present an overview of Canadian share repurchases, investigate why firms repurchase and how the stock market reacts to them, and contrast the findings for Canada with those for the U.S. To explain why firms repurchase we focus on two hypotheses: signaling and agency conflicts, and implement a conditional event study to test those hypotheses.
The intriguing phenomenon associated with U.S. open market repurchases is the significant, positive abnormal stock return around their announcement. Comment and Jarrell (1991) find an average abnormal announcement period return of 2.3% around U.S. open market repurchases and conclude that the increase in value is due to new earnings information signaled by the repurchase.
We find the same pattern of cumulative abnormal returns around NCIBs as Comment and Jarrell report for the U.S. data. The similarity in the return behavior suggests that signaling could be one reason why Canadian firms engage in NCIBs.
Despite similarities in the price reaction to buyback announcements, there are substantial institutional differences between Canadian and U.S. repurchases. NCIBs must be completed in one year and are restricted in size to a legal maximum proportion of shares, whereas U.S. repurchases are unrestricted in duration and size. Most importantly, U.S. firms announce the target proportion of shares that they intend to buy back, while we find that more than two-thirds of the Canadian firms in our sample announce the legal maximum that they are entitled to buy back. Our Canadian data provide a different institutional setting to examine various hypotheses proposed in the U.S. studies.
The different content of the repurchase announcements has important implications for testing the signaling hypothesis. U.S. studies model the target proportion as a continuous signal, and test signaling with a standard event study. The abnormal announcement period return is regressed against the signal (the target repurchase proportion), and a positive relationship is taken as support for the signaling hypothesis. Canadian announcements are less informative: firms do not announce their target proportion, so the fact of the announcement is the only information. If the NCIB announcement is a signal, then it is not continuous.
In this paper, we employ a conditional event study model to test whether NCIB announcements are discrete signals, following the pioneering work of Acharya (1988) who applies the model to test signaling with calls of convertible bonds. In a signaling model, the price reaction is conditional on the signal, and the insiders' decision to signal is the outcome of a rational choice based on their private information. Acharya (1988) argues that the conditional event study is the only correct way to test for a discrete signal, because it estimates the announcement period return conditional on the insiders' decision to signal; the standard event study method does not, and so is mis-specified. Prabhala (1997) adds that a conditional information structure is not sufficient to assure the superiority of the conditional event study method. Another necessary condition is that the data include firms that did not engage in the activity, the so-called non-event sample. In this study we include a sample of firms that did not make NCIB announcements over the sample period, which provides further justification for adopting the conditional event study.
We examine the agency conflict hypothesis as the alternative explanation for why Canadian firms engage in open market repurchases. Jensen (1986) argues that repurchases consume a firm's free cash flow and, hence, prevent insiders from engaging in negative net present value (NPV) projects that reduce the wealth of the outside shareholders. Following Shleifer and Vishny (1988) , we expect repurchases to be initiated in firms where there are large shareholders amongst the insiders. Large shareholders are willing to instigate a repurchase, because they receive a benefit in added wealth that offsets their costs from reduced perquisite consumption. This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, in contrast to standard event studies using U.S. repurchase data that treat the announced repurchase proportion as a continuous signal, this paper adopts the conditional event study approach to test the hypothesis that Canadian open market share repurchase announcements are discrete signals. Second, our original Canadian data set provides a unique opportunity to examine various hypotheses on share repurchases under a different institutional setting. Finally, we use Bayesian methods to estimate the conditional event study model. The Bayesian approach produces estimates with nice finite sample properties, which is important for empirical corporate finance studies that are plagued with small samples.
Our results can be summarized as follows. We find that the abnormal return conditional on a NCIB announcement is significantly larger than the abnormal return conditional on no announcement, and so we fail to reject the signaling hypothesis. The signaling result is similar to those of U.S. studies (e.g., Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1981) , Comment and Jarrell (1991), and McNally (1999) ), which overwhelmingly conclude that open market share repurchases are signals.
We also find that Canadian firms are more likely to buy back shares if they are smaller, if their insiders own a larger proportion of shares, and if they have greater free cash flow than their nonrepurchasing counterparts. These results are consistent with the agency conflict hypothesis. In summary, we conclude that Canadian firms use NCIBs to signal that they are undervalued when they have large financial slack, and there are insiders to champion the repurchase for whom the benefit in increased wealth offsets any loss in perquisite consumption.
The focus in this paper differs from that of Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) . Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) study the actual repurchase activity and the long-run returns following Canadian NCIBs. They find that repurchase completion rates are higher for value firms and that firms tend to repurchase more in a month when their prior stock returns are lower.
Moreover, value firms have worse pre-announcement stock price performance and better long-run performance than do growth firms. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) conclude that their evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that insiders are motivated to buy back shares when their stock is undervalued. In contrast, we investigate why firms initiate NCIBs and why the market responds with a significantly positive abnormal announcement period return. Our conditional event study examines a number of competing hypotheses that are not considered by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) . Hence, our research complements theirs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the institutional framework guiding Canadian normal course issuer bids in comparison to that of U.S. open market repurchases. Section II compares the characteristics of the NCIB firms with those of a group of non-NCIB firms that did not make open market repurchases during the sample period. Section III introduces the two main hypotheses, and in Section IV we develop and estimate a conditional event study model to test those hypotheses. Section V concludes.
I. An Overview of Share Repurchases in Canada
In Canada, share repurchases are governed by the provincial securities acts. If repurchases are carried out through the facilities of an exchange, then they are subject to the exchange's general by-laws, which supersede the provincial securities acts. In the U.S., all forms of share repurchases are executed under the statutory requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC).
According to Section 23.13 of the TSE by-laws, an "issuer bid" is an offer to acquire (TSE) listed voting or equity securities made by the issuer firm. A "normal course issuer bid" is an issuer bid made at the market price, and may not exceed the greater of 5% of shares outstanding or 10% of public float over a twelve-month period. The public float is equal to the total number of shares outstanding less the insider shareholdings. In contrast, both Vermaelen (1981) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that U.S. open market repurchases can last more than one year and that, on average, the announced repurchase proportion is between 5% -8% of the shares outstanding. In Canada, issuer bids for more than 5% and/or at prices in excess of the prevailing market prices are called "substantial issuer bids," which include fixed price offers, Dutch auctions, and takeover bids.
Issuers are prohibited from selling more securities of the class(es) subject to the bid during the course of the bid.
2
The procedure for making a normal course issuer bid at the TSE (TSE by-laws, Appendix F) is as follows. The issuer firm files with the exchange a notice of intention that contains material information about the bid, such as the name of the issuer, the class(es) and maximum number(s) of shares sought, the duration of the bid including both the commencement and termination dates, the exchange(s) where shares will be purchased, the reason(s) for the bid, and the names of the tendering insiders, if any. Once the notice of intention is finalized with the exchange, the firm is required to issue a press release that summarizes the material content of its TSE filing. In the U.S., firms are not required to register their open market share repurchases with the SEC or to announce their repurchases, but most firms opt to do so to obtain "safe harbor" from liability for manipulation under Rule 10b-18 (Stephens and Weisbach (1998) ). The normal course issuer bid may commence on the date that is two trading days after the latest of (1) the date of acceptance of the issuer's notice of intention or (2) the date of the press announcement. The issuer firm is not required to announce the completion of the bid and generally does not, but it is required to disclose the number of shares that it has repurchased and this information is published monthly by the TSE.
As in the U.S., the proceeds to shareholders from open market stock repurchases are taxed as capital gains (Income Tax Act 1988, Subsection 84(6) ). Capital gains are taxed at a slightly higher rate than dividends in Canada. Nevertheless, repurchases may still be attractive because they can reduce personal taxes. Bagwell and Shoven (1988) and 1996 (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) ). Given that NCIBs are common, we expect that the market assign a non-trivial probability to the likelihood of any firm announcing one, and choose the non-event sample randomly from the TSE firms that did not make NCIB
announcements. The reason that we do not employ any matching criteria to construct the non-event sample is that pre-sorting firms based on such criteria biases event-non-event probabilities, and does so in potentially different ways across the two samples (Nayak and Prabhala (2000) ).
To compile a sample of non-event firms that did not make normal course issuer bids during the same period, we selected from the 676 Canadian firms covered by Standard and Poor's during the period 1985-1994. The set of firms provided by Standard and Poor's is used to ensure the availability of accounting data. We excluded firms that engaged in repurchases during the sample period, and then randomly selected 150 firms from the remainder. 5 Five of the selected firms were found to have no data on the TSE/Western database, so the non-NCIB sample was further reduced to 145 firms. Each non-NCIB firm was assigned a fictitious announcement date, chosen randomly from a weekday in the sample period 1989-1992. The average proportion sought is 5.41%, the median sought is 5%, and the average value of the shares sought is $20.25 million. In many of the announcements the number of shares targeted is equal to the maximum allowed under TSE by-laws. Half of our 183 NCIB firms announced repurchases with proportions lying in the interval from 4.9% to 5.1%. Another 17% of the sample announced target proportions that were very close to the alternate maximum of 10% of the public float. The little variation in the announced target repurchase proportion prevents it from signaling firm-specific information to the market. Instead, we treat the repurchase announcement as the insiders' choice variable, which has important implications for our empirical model in Section IV.
C. Summary Statistics
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Panel B of Table 1 shows that of the 183 NCIB announcements in our sample, 72 are made by firms that also made an announcement in the previous year (called repeating firms). There is no difference in the proportions sought between repeating and non-repeating firms. A univariate analysis of repeating versus non-repeating issuers also reveals no differences in firm characteristics or announcement period returns across the two samples. Panel C of Table 1 provides a list of the reasons firms gave for their repurchases. The majority, 69%, of NCIBs are motivated by management's belief that the firm's shares "represent a good investment" or "are currently undervalued by the market." Twelve percent of the issuer bids 6 The results of our conditional event study are not affected by introducing a repeat dummy variable in the analysis. The repeat dummy takes the value of one if the firm made an announcement in the previous year and zero otherwise.
are motivated to offset the dilution caused by employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), and the remaining 19% of the announcements do not offer a clear motive.
Since the purpose of this paper is to explain why firms repurchase (when that reason is unknown or in doubt), we exclude ESOP-motivated repurchases from our subsequent analysis. We do not question ESOP-related repurchases because repurchasing firms gain nothing by trying to mislead investors with such announcements (and investors have nothing to lose from believing them). ESOPs are easily verifiable and the repurchases that offset them have a predictable effect on stock prices. In fact, there should be no change in price for an ESOP offsetting NCIB announcement. Consistent with the above view, we find that the abnormal announcement period returns for the NCIB firms with ESOPs are all insignificantly different from zero, whereas, as described below, there are significant abnormal returns for firms without ESOPs that announce
NCIBs. Comment and Jarrell (1991) , and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) .
[Insert Figure 1 about here] Table 2 provides summary statistics for the repurchasing firms and for the non-NCIB firms.
The NCIB sample in Table 2 is smaller than that in Table 1 , because firms are dropped if their repurchase offsets the ESOP, or if there are missing values for the main variables as listed in Table   2 . The final sample has 98 NCIB and 112 non-NCIB firms. Xret3-Xret19 are the 3-to 19-day excess returns (in excess of concurrent returns on the value-weighted market index) for event windows centred on the announcement day. The abnormal announcement period returns of NCIB firms are significantly larger than those of non-NCIB firms for all windows except the 3-day window according to the difference in means t-test. Using the Wilcoxon rank test, only the 3-, and 7-day returns indicate no significant difference across the two samples at the 10% level. The abnormal announcement period returns of NCIBs range from a low of 0.57% for the 3-day window to a high of 2.56% for the 19-day window. The abnormal return gets bigger as the window widens, as is evident from Figure 1 . We suspect this is caused by information leakage prior to the actual repurchase announcement. As a result, the wider windows provide a more accurate picture of the price reaction to the NCIB announcements.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The average proportion sought is 5.44% and the median is 5%. The lack of variation in the target proportion variable can be seen from its small standard deviation of 1.42%. The median reduction in shares outstanding for announcing firms is 0.04%. We find that slightly over half (54%) of the announcements result in a reduction of shares outstanding by one year after the announcement, but on average firms increase their shares outstanding by 3.79%. According to officials at the TSE, the increase is caused by the exercise of stock options and convertible securities, neither of which is prohibited during the course of NCIBs. Although only half of the NCIB firms reduce their shares outstanding by the end of the year, we find that over three-quarters of the firms do repurchase some shares in the twelve-month period following the announcement. In contrast, there is a median increase in the shares outstanding for the non-NCIB firms equal to 0.49% and a mean increase of 10.3%. In the U.S., Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that between 74% and 82% of the shares targeted in open market repurchases are acquired within three years of the announcement. Table 2 also makes other comparisons between the repurchasing firms and the non-NCIB firms. Repurchasing firms are more closely held. Insiders own 29.38% on average of the class of shares targeted for repurchase, whereas insiders own only 9.82% of their firms' shares in the non-NCIB sample, and the difference is statistically significant. Repurchasing firms are small; in fact, they are smaller than the average TSE-listed firm. The average market capitalization of TSE listings was $471 million in 1992, while the average size of the listings targeted for repurchase over the sample period was $261.8 million. The non-NCIB group, randomly sampled from the set of firms covered in the special file provided by Standard and Poor's, is twice the average TSE firm size due to Standard and Poor's bias towards large firms. Repurchasing firms generate greater cash flow than do the non-NCIB firms. Free cash flow is almost 6.17% of total assets compared to the non-NCIB firms' average of 1.27%. The difference in means is significant at the 5% level and the difference in medians is significant at the 10% level. The returns of repurchasing firms are more volatile than those of non-repurchasing firms, although their betas are not significantly different.
The average and median volatility of returns for the NCIB sample are significantly larger than those for the non-NCIB sample at the 5% level. In summary, we find that NCIB firms have more concentrated shareholdings, are smaller, have greater free cash flow, and their returns are more volatile than firms that do not initiate NCIBs.
Finally, Table 2 shows that the NCIB and non-NCIB samples are similar in the following aspects. 7 There is no significant difference between the two groups in leverage (short and long-term debt over total assets), market-to-book ratio, or stock market performance prior to the announcement (denoted X60bef). The latter two results suggest that firms announcing NCIBs are not undervalued by traditional, publicly observable measures. If these firms are undervalued, then it must be relative to their insiders' private information. These results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis, which argues that repurchases are used by insiders to signal to the market their private information about the firm's favorable future prospects. We describe the signaling hypothesis in more detail in the next section.
III. Why Do Firms Repurchase?
We focus on the information signaling and agency conflict hypotheses to explain why firms repurchase and why their stock prices rise after an NCIB announcement. According to the signaling hypothesis, a repurchase is announced when insiders have private information that their stock is undervalued, and the market revalues the firm conditional on the announcement. The agency conflict hypothesis recognizes that there are agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control in a modern corporation. 8 When financial slack is large, insiders have the opportunity to consume perquisites and engage in value decreasing activities. A repurchase reduces financial slack and agency costs and so increases the share price. Regardless of whether repurchases signal or reduce agency costs, insiders benefit from the increase in price, but suffer from the decrease in perquisite consumption. A repurchase is more likely to occur when insiders have a large ownership stake in the firm. Then the gain in wealth from their shareholdings offsets the decrease in perquisite consumption. This section provides a detailed description of the two hypotheses and outlines their testable implications, and Section VI develops an empirical model to test those implications.
A. Signaling
In Appendix II we present a cheap-talk signaling model of repurchase announcements and prove the existence of a separating equilibrium. In the model, a firm receives private information about its expected future earnings, µ ∈T. T is partitioned, so that T = G ∪ N. If earnings are in subset G, then the firm's future earnings are expected to be higher, and if earnings fall into subset N then there is no change in the firm's earnings. The insiders of the firm choose to signal when doing so increases their utility. The insiders' utility depends on their firm's earnings, µ, and the market's valuation. The latter is conditional on the signal issued by the firm. Thus, the insiders' utility can be expressed as E[U(µ,NCIB)], where NCIB = 1 if a repurchase is announced, and NCIB = 0 otherwise.
A cheap-talk signaling equilibrium requires that the sender (the firm's insiders) have the same preferences over type (earnings) and signal as the receiver (the market). 9 We assume that the market desires an unbiased valuation, and in Appendix II we show that insiders prefer to truthfully reveal themselves through the signal. The insiders' incremental utility from signaling and receiving a high valuation is positive for firms with earnings in subset G (higher earnings) and negative for firms with earnings in subset N (unchanged earnings). The insiders' incremental utility, , y can be expressed as:
In the separating equilibrium, the market correctly infers the firm's type: when it observes a repurchase announcement it infers that the earnings are in subset G, that y ≥ 0, and it increases the firm's stock price; and when it observes no announcement it infers that the earnings are in subset N, that y < 0, and it leaves the firm's stock price unchanged. We summarize the observation rule as follows:
The empirical implication is that the average announcement period return of firms announcing repurchases is larger than the average announcement period return of firms not announcing repurchases:
Or, given the observation rule in Equations (2)- (3):
As noted by Acharya (1988) , to test whether the return is larger for firms announcing NCIBs, we must estimate the announcement period return conditional on the insiders' decision rule. In Section IV we develop an empirical model that yields a correctly specified test of the implication outlined in Equation (5).
B. Principal-Agent Conflicts
While repurchases may signal future earnings, like dividends, they also play a role in mitigating principal-agent conflicts within the firm (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000))-the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders and outsiders are a consequence of the separation of ownership and control inherent in a modern corporation (Berle and Means (1932) , Coase (1937) , and Jensen and Meckling (1976) ).
When insiders control corporate resources, they have the opportunity to deploy those resources in ways that benefit themselves but may not benefit outside shareholders, for example, in pursuing growth or market share instead of maximizing value, or in the direct consumption of perquisites (e.g., sumptuous offices, corporate jets, etc.). When insiders waste resources on negative NPV projects, repurchases are one way of removing excess cash from insiders' discretion (Jensen (1986) ). Thus, repurchases may increase firm value because they reduce financial slack and hence the opportunities for insiders to squander corporate resources.
The definition of insiders varies slightly across the signaling and agency conflict hypotheses.
Under the signaling hypothesis, insiders are shareholders who have access to the firm's proprietary information and who are also the decision makers. These shareholders are sometimes called the controlling shareholders. Outsiders are the uninformed outside shareholders. Under the agency conflict hypothesis, insiders are individuals who benefit from squandering the firm's resources.
These people include both the controlling shareholders and corporate executives, who can implement policies that benefit themselves at the expense of outside shareholders. We use the term "insiders" to refer to the controlling shareholders that may include executives who hold shares in the firm.
Agency costs are increasing in the amount of financial slack. When financial slack is small, firms run a greater risk of bankruptcy because of their reduced ability to survive low cash flow periods. Bankruptcy hurts both the controlling shareholders and managers; the latter often lose their jobs. The natural response of the firm is to cut costs so as to release additional cash flow to meet surprises. Cost saving efforts reduce the opportunity for insiders to engage in value decreasing activities and perquisite consumption. Thus, when financial slack is low, agency costs are low and the benefit from implementing a repurchase to reduce them is also low. Under the agency conflict hypothesis, firms with small financial slack are unlikely to make repurchases.
Repurchases have two offsetting effects on insiders. On one hand, a repurchase increases firm value either by signaling higher future earnings or by reducing agency costs, or both. The rise in firm value increases the shareholder wealth for both insiders and outsiders. On the other hand, a repurchase reduces insiders' perquisite consumption. A repurchase will only be initiated if the insiders' gain in wealth exceeds their loss. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , one circumstance under which the gain dominates is when insiders are large shareholders. If insiders have small shareholdings, then the dollar increase in their wealth resulting from a repurchase may be quite small even if the proportionate increase in firm value is large. We conjecture that firms with large shareholders are more likely to announce repurchases.
IV. A Conditional Event Study of Normal Course Issuer Bids

A. The Model
Tests of signaling with U.S. repurchases have so far all adopted the standard event study methodology. The standard event study, developed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) , follows a two-step procedure. First, the change in firm value is measured, usually by the abnormal announcement period return, to assess the amount of information revealed. Then the change is crossing condition, which is necessary for equilibria with costly signals.
related statistically to hypothesized causal factors. In tests of signaling, the second step involves a cross-sectional regression of the announcement period return on the level of the signal (the target proportion) (Comment and Jarrell (1991), and McNally (1999) ). The standard event study is not appropriate for evaluating our cheap-talk signaling model because it does not condition on the insiders' decision rule, and the correlation between the signal and the price reaction is not defined.
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Acharya (1988) and Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990) argue that if insiders are rational and there is information asymmetry, then voluntary corporate events are endogenous decisions of insiders with respect to the perceived benefit they can obtain from the event. This is particularly true of signaling, where the price reaction is conditional on the signal and the insiders' decision to signal anticipates the price reaction. The standard event study fails to model this endogeneity, hence, as Acharya (1988) argues, it cannot be construed as a test of the signaling paradigm. In contrast, the conditional event study explicitly conditions on the insiders' optimizing decision. In this paper, we model NCIBs as discrete signals, and test signaling using the conditional event study.
In Section III we argued that a repurchase is announced if the insiders' incremental utility is positive. Under the signaling hypothesis, the incremental utility is dependent on the insiders' private information, which is unobservable, so, empirically, we model the insiders' utility as a latent variable. We define a random variable * y to be the insiders' incremental utility associated with making the announcement, and assume that µ γ + = * y is normally distributed over the sigmaalgebra of the insiders' latent information (the type of earnings) space. Its mean,
represents the market's expectations of the insiders' increased utility. The insiders' private assessment of their increased utility is denoted, µ, and can be characterized as:
10 To confirm the unsuitability of the standard event study, we ran a cross-sectional regression (using only the NCIB sample) of the abnormal announcement period return on the proportion of shares sought, a repeat dummy variable and all of the variables listed in Panel A of Table 5 . Using both the OLS and heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors, neither the proportion of shares sought nor the repeat dummy has any effect on the excess return around the announcement.
µ is not observable to the market, and, under the signaling hypothesis, is determined by the earnings information allocated by nature. The market forms its inference of the latent variable * y based on its observation of the repurchase announcement,
That is, the normal course issuer bid is announced (NCIB = 1) if the insiders' incremental utility, * y , is "large enough" or, alternatively, if their private assessment of the incremental utility, µ, is favorable enough. (0 is an arbitrarily chosen cutoff level with no effect on our final results.)
For simplicity and generality, we assume the market's expectations of the insiders' incremental utility to be a linear function, ,
where θ is a vector of k parameters and Z is an k n × matrix of repurchase related variables in the market's information set. The variables in Z are publicly known and used by the market to predict the insiders' incremental utility from announcing a repurchase. In Part B of this section we describe the elements of the Z matrix.
Our conditional event study models the abnormal announcement period return as follows:
where R is the abnormal announcement period return (the difference between the return on the stock and the concurrent return on the TSE value-weighted market index), and X includes the variables suggested by Fama and French (1993) to explain the cross-section of stock returns (i.e., size and market-to-book). The coefficient on the NCIB dummy, λ, can be interpreted as the average abnormal return associated with the NCIB announcement, after controlling for the X variables in Equation (9). We expect λ to be positive and statistically significant. The model in Equations (10)- (11) provides a means for testing the signaling hypothesis. The implication of the signaling hypothesis as given in Equation (5) is that the abnormal return conditional on a repurchase is larger than the abnormal return conditional on no announcement.
Assuming that variables in the X matrix are unrelated to the signal, a test of Equation (5) is equivalent to a test of:
where φ(x) and Φ(x) are the normal density and distribution functions, respectively. The term σ µε is the covariance between the insiders' private information, µ, in Equation (10) and the residual, ε, in the abnormal announcement period return equation (Equation (11)). The two terms involving the covariance in Equation (12) Our conditional event study establishes a rich basis for inference. The estimates of the θ vector in Equation (10) allow us to examine why firms repurchase. To test Equation (12) we posit its opposite as our null hypothesis, that is, there is no signaling with NCIB announcements. Note that the inequality in Equation (12) depends on two parameters from our system: λ and σ µε , we rewrite the null of no signaling as H 0 : λ ≤ 0, σ µε ≤ 0. The sign of these inequalities can be established by means of simple significance tests on the parameters.
To the extent that the covariance, σ µε , is significantly different from zero, an unconditional estimation of Equation (11) (e.g., a standard event study regression) will yield biased estimates of the coefficients (Prabhala (1997) ).
B. The Market's Expectations of A Repurchase
The Z matrix in Equation (10) includes all variables used by the market to understand the insiders' incentive to announce a repurchase. In Section III we identified two factors that would increase the likelihood of the insiders' making a repurchase: the presence of large shareholders and financial slack. In this section we introduce a number of proxies for those two factors, an information asymmetry variable, and variables related to two other theories that have been suggested in the literature. Table 3 summarizes the relationships between the variables in the Z matrix and the likelihood that the firm makes a repurchase announcement.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Our primary measure of financial slack is free cash flow, which is obtained as net income less dividends plus depreciation over total assets. Our free cash flow variable is very similar to that of Lehn and Poulsen (1989) , except that we omit deferred taxes due to missing data for a significant fraction of our sample. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) Given that free cash flow might not accurately capture a firm's financial slack, we include proxies for investment opportunities and marginal financing costs which have been used in recent studies of the agency conflict hypothesis. According to Bagwell and Shoven (1988) The agency conflict hypothesis predicts that firms whose insiders have large shareholdings are more likely to announce repurchases. We measure insider shareholdings as the proportion of shares held by officers, directors and blockholders. A firm with a large proportion of shares held by insiders is more likely to have large shareholders and more likely to announce a repurchase. It is possible that the proportion held by insiders could take a large value, not because of a few large shareholders, but because there are a large number of insiders all with small shareholdings. To control for this we employ two other measures that are known to be highly correlated with the presence of large shareholders. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that the cost of being a large shareholder is lower in small firms, and that firms with large firm-specific uncertainty provide a greater potential for benefit from monitoring and so those firms are more likely to attract large shareholders. We measure firm size using the log of market capitalization, and firm-specific uncertainty using the volatility of stock returns (i.e., the annualized standard deviation of daily returns from event day −250 to −1).
A commonly tested corollary to signaling is that small firms are more likely to signal than large firms because of a greater information asymmetry problem (Vermaelen (1981) , and Comment and Jarrell (1991) ). If NCIB announcements are signals, then we would expect small firms to be more likely to make a NCIB announcement.
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Besides the signaling and agency conflict explanations for repurchases, there are two other hypotheses that the market might use to form its expectations of the likelihood that the firm will announce a repurchase. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that open market repurchases give insiders the option to buy undervalued shares from the firm's outside shareholders. They predict that the value of the option (i.e., the abnormal announcement period return) is positively related to the percentage of shares sought and to the volatility of returns. If the option hypothesis is true, then the market would expect firms with greater return volatility to be more likely to create the option by announcing an open market repurchase.
Finally, Vermaelen (1995, 2000) argue that undervaluation motivates repurchases. Under the undervaluation hypothesis, insiders buy back shares when they perceive their shares to be undervalued-as captured by publicly observable measures such as declining stock returns prior to the announcement and low market-to-book ratios. Consistent with this view, Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that repurchasing firms in the U.S. usually experience poor stock market performance prior to the repurchase announcement. If the undervaluation hypothesis applies to the Canadian data, then the market would expect that firms with a low market-to-book ratio and a sustained idiosyncratic price decline would be more likely to make an NCIB announcement. Following previous studies, we measure the trend of share prices using the CARs over the 40-, 60-, and 100-day periods prior to the announcement.
11 Fenn and Liang (1997) argue that repurchases are more likely when officers and directors own stock options. To test this hypothesis, we included shares reserved for conversion (Compustat item A40) in our regressions. However, there are many missing observations for this variable. In the reduced sample we did not find the option variable to have any explanatory power. We do not report those results in Table 5 .
C. Estimation
We estimate the empirical model in Equations (10)- (11) using Bayesian methods developed in Li (1998) . The Bayesian approach to conditional event studies is different from the seminal work by Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990) and Acharya (1988) . Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990) introduce an adjustment term in their cross-sectional regression of announcement returns on exogenous variables to account for the fact that corporate events are voluntary and insiders are rational. The rationale for their approach is that their sample contains only the event firms (i.e., a truncated sample), and the adjustment term is obtained from inferring the insiders' decision rule. In contrast, we employ a sample including both event and non-event firms.
Acharya (1988) performs a test of the signaling hypothesis using data on the call of outstanding convertible bonds. His study employs a similar two-equation system as specified above, and Acharya estimates the system using a two-step procedure. The drawbacks of this two-step procedure are well known in the econometrics literature. The coefficients of the management decision equation (Equation (10)) must be estimated before the Mills ratio (see Equation (12)) is added to the cross-section return equation (Equation (11)) as the adjustment term, which introduces an errors-in-variables problem and also makes the error term in the return equation (Equation (11)) heteroscedastic. In contrast, these problems are absent from our Bayesian approach when we estimate the two-equation system simultaneously. Our Bayesian conditional event study approach also produces estimates with nice finite sample properties, which is important given our small sample. Table 4 reports the posterior estimates of the insiders' decision equation (Equation (10)), the abnormal announcement period return equation (Equation (11)), and elements of the variancecovariance matrix Σ. For robustness, we also estimated Equations (10)-(11) using the 3-, 7-, 11-, 15-, and 19-day abnormal announcement period returns, the 40-and 100-day CARs prior to the announcement, and various proxies for free cash flow, external financing costs, and investment opportunities. In all cases we obtained results similar to those reported in Table 4 .
D. Results
[Insert Table 4 about here]
To test the signaling hypothesis, the null is that H 0 : λ ≤ 0, σ εu ≤ 0. If we reject the null, we fail to reject signaling. In Panel B of Table 4 , λ is a statistically significant 3.66, which means that on average, there is a 3.66% abnormal return associated with the announcement of NCIBs after controlling for size and market-to-book. In Panel C of Table 4 , our estimate of the covariance term, σ uε , is not significantly different from zero, and the posterior odds ratio comparing a model with zero covariance and a simultaneous two-equation system (with nonzero covariance) reaches the same conclusion. 12 We conclude that λ > 0 and σ εu = 0, and we fail to reject the signaling hypothesis: the abnormal return conditional on an NCIB announcement is larger than the abnormal return conditional on no announcement.
Estimation of the binary insider decision equation (Equation (10) with greater free cash flow buy back more of their shares. In addition, we find that firms whose insiders hold a greater proportion of shares are more likely to initiate an NCIB-the coefficient on insider holdings is positive and significant. Finally, we find that small Canadian firms, which are more prone to information asymmetries, are more likely to initiate share repurchase programs than are large Canadian firms-the coefficient on size is negative and statistically significant. This result may be partially due to the large firm bias in the non-NCIB sample, but we do not believe that the sample bias is the sole reason for this result. Our NCIB sample firms are also smaller than the average TSE-listed firms (see Section II, Part C). In summary, we find that, ceteris paribus, small firms with large shareholders are more likely to announce NCIBs when they have excess cash.
Not all of the proxies for the agency conflict hypothesis are significant. There is no evidence that firms with smaller market-to-book ratios (fewer investment opportunities) are more likely to engage in a repurchase. Nor do we find that firms with high leverage (higher external financing costs) are less likely to repurchase. The coefficient on leverage is negative, as predicted, but insignificant. Finally, the volatility of returns (the proxy for the presence of large shareholders) is not related to the repurchase decision. This last result also casts doubt on the option hypothesis of Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) , which predicts that firms with volatile returns are more likely to initiate a repurchase.
The results in Panel A of Table 4 suggest that undervaluation according to publicly available measures does not explain why firms make repurchases. Neither low market-to-book ratios, nor poor stock market performance prior to the announcement (in terms of cumulative excess returns X60bef) are associated with a greater likelihood of an NCIB.
In conclusion, using the data on Canadian normal course issuer bids and a group of non-NCIB firms, the results of our conditional event study are consistent with both the signaling and agency conflict hypotheses. We find that small firms with large shareholders and financial slack are more likely to repurchase shares in Canada.
V. Conclusions
This paper examines open market share repurchases in Canada and employs a conditional event study framework to investigate why firms buy back shares and why the stock market responds favourably to repurchase announcements.
We find that the pattern of stock returns around Canadian NCIBs is identical to the pattern of returns around U.S. open market repurchases. Canadian NCIB announcements are preceded by a small decline in share price, accompanied by a significant announcement period return, and are followed by a sustained increase in price. Canadian NCIB announcements are credible, as over 75% of our NCIB sample firms buy back some shares over the twelve-month period after their announcements.
In comparison to a group of non-NCIB firms that did not make repurchases over the sample period, we find that repurchasing firms are smaller, more closely held and have more volatile stock returns. Moreover, repurchasing firms have market-to-book ratios similar to those of the firms in the non-NCIB sample, and their prior stock price performance is not significantly different from that of the control group. Finally, NCIB firms tend to have greater free cash flow.
We develop a conditional event study model to examine why firms repurchase and what determines the abnormal announcement period return. Our estimation results are consistent with both the signaling and agency conflict hypotheses. We cannot reject the hypothesis that Canadian firms use repurchases to signal good news. The abnormal return conditional on an NCIB announcement is significantly larger than the abnormal return conditional on no announcement, and small firms are more likely to repurchase. Thus, there may be considerable truth to firms' claims that their shares are undervalued, but the undervaluation is relative to their insiders' private information, not to publicly observable measures. The failure to reject signaling is consistent with conclusions reached in U.S. studies by Dann (1981) , Vermaelen (1981) , Comment and Jarrell (1991), and McNally (1999) .
We are also unable to reject the hypothesis that repurchases are motivated to reduce agency costs. We find that firms with greater financial slack are more likely to repurchase and it is such firms that are more likely to suffer from significant agency costs. We also find that small firms with large insider shareholdings are more likely to repurchase. Small firms where insiders own a large proportion of shares are more likely to have large shareholders, and only large shareholders have the incentive to instigate repurchases so as to reduce agency costs.
We do not find support for the hypothesis that repurchases are a means for corporate insiders to engage in informed trading at the expense of outside shareholders as suggested by Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) . Nor do we find support for the hypothesis that firms initiate repurchases when their shares are undervalued, as measured by low market-to-book ratios and poor stock price performance.
An obvious policy recommendation following from this research is that Canadian regulators should consider relaxing the 5% maximum or, as in the U.S., removing it entirely. This would allow NCIBs to function in a manner analogous to their U.S. counterparts-as continuous signals of future earningsthus giving Canadian firms a more precise means of conveying information to the market and thereby reducing information asymmetry.
Appendix I NCIB Sample Construction
Our sample covers the period between January 1, 1989 and December 31, 1992. We identified public announcements of Canadian corporate stock buybacks by conducting a variety of keyword searches on two outlets of CNW news items: Lexis/Nexis and InfoGlobe. The more recent announcements (from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992) were obtained from Lexis/Nexis, using keywords "issuer bids," "buybacks," "repurchase," "tender offers" and "date = 1992." This search yielded 105 announcements of which none were self-tender offers. Due to the short history of Lexis/Nexis, the first part of our sample (covering the period from January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1991) was obtained by searching the CNW archives at InfoGlobe. The second search was more refined and focused on issuer bids on the TSE, using keywords "issuer bids" and "Toronto Stock
Exchange." The search yielded 224 issuer bid announcements that took place on the TSE during the 1989-1991 period. The two searches generated a total of 329 repurchase-related announcements between January 1, 1989 and December 31, 1992.
Appendix II A Cheap-Talk Signaling Model of NCIB Announcements
An NCIB announcement can be modeled as a dynamic two-player game with imperfect information. Consider a four period sequence with distinct events at 0, 1, 2, and 3 (see Figure 2) . A risk averse insider (controlling shareholder) controls an already existing firm. The firm will generate a terminal payout at time period 3, which ultimately drives the value of the firm. At time period 0, nature moves first by assigning the firm its new level of earnings, then the insider announces (or does not announce) an NCIB, and the market calculates its valuation of the firm. At time period 1, there is some probability that the market discovers the new earnings information and so may revalue the firm. At time period 2 the firm executes its repurchase and at time period 3 the firm pays out. The object of the game is the valuation of the firm at time period 1.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The set of expected earnings types are generated from a set, T, that is partitioned into two:
good earnings, G, and unchanged earnings, N. T=G∪N.
, and µ N < µ L . Earnings in subset G can be interpreted as new, higher expected earnings. We will assume that the interest rate is zero and that the market is risk-neutral, so the full-information market value of the firm, V, is equal to its expected earnings, µ.
The insider initially owns the proportion α of the single outstanding share, and the signal available to her is a repurchase announcement denoted NCIB, which takes the value 1 for an announcement and 0 for no announcement. The announcement is cheap talk because it is assumed to be costless. The insider's objective is to maximize expected utility at time period 1. The insider's wealth at period 1 is her holdings in the firm, W 1 = α V. The insider has the mean-variance utility:
The market values the firm at time period 0 and maintains that valuation at time period 1 unless nature reveals the truth to it. The market's value is denoted V(NCIB), which indicates that the value is conditional on the signal. The market's objective is an unbiased valuation. The market also holds posterior beliefs about the firm's type, which are denoted p(T|NCIB).
As in the Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) model, there is some uncertainty as to the trading price at time period 1 because there is a probability, π , that the true value of the firm is realized by the market at period 1. If the truth revelation state obtains, then the firm is worth its true value. If the truth is not revealed, then the insider's shares are worth the value conjectured by the market at time period 0. If the insider has falsely signaled her firm's value, then her wealth falls from the level deduced by the market at time period 0.The uncertainty at time period 1 makes false signaling costly by increasing the insider's exposure to risk (the risk of being caught deceiving the market).
The value of the firm at time period 1, denoted , Ṽ is therefore a random variable with mean and standard deviation:
The insider's objective function is therefore: 
Proof:
A separating equilibrium obtains if a low earnings type's utility is higher if it refrains from signaling than if it signals to mimic the high earnings type, and if the high earnings type prefers to signal. This is the Crawford and Sobel (1982) screening condition. For the low earnings type the condition is:
This condition holds with the equilibrium beliefs and strategies if
. The high earnings type prefers to signal if:
This inequality holds G ì ∈ ∀ if the above condition on b holds and if µ N < µ L , which is true by assumption.
The intuition for the equilibrium is that false signaling increases the insider's uncertainty as to future wealth, and correct signaling reduces that uncertainty. Insiders of high earnings firms receive a significant increase in expected wealth and reduced uncertainty as to their future wealth if they signal, whereas insiders of unchanged earnings firms receive a smaller increase in expected wealth but also an increase in uncertainty if they signal. If insiders are sufficiently risk averse, then an unchanged earnings type finds that the uncertainty associated with falsely signaling offsets the potentially greater wealth and chooses not to mimic a high earnings type. All high earnings types in subset G find it worthwhile to signal because it increases their expected wealth and reduces the potential variability in their wealth. Table 2 Summary Statistics of NCIB and Non-NCIB Firms
The NCIB sample includes 98 normal course issuer bids on the TSE during 1989-1992. The non-NCIB sample includes 112 randomly selected non-repurchasing firms over the same period. Test of Difference gives the p-values from a T-test and a Wilcoxon rank test of the difference between the NCIB sample and the non-NCIB sample. The pvalues assume unequal variances for the two samples. Xret3, Xret5, Xret7, Xret11, Xret15, and Xret19 are the 3-, 5-, 7-, 11-, 15-, and 19-day announcement period returns in excess of the concurrent market returns, respectively. Sought is the proportion of shares sought in an NCIB. Bought is the actual percentage reduction in the shares outstanding after one year. Insider holdings is the proportion of shares held by officers, directors and large blockholders. Size is computed as the product of the number of shares outstanding before the announcement and the average price for the 60 trading-day period ending 7 days before the announcement. Free cash flow is net income less dividends plus depreciation expressed as a percentage of total assets. Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of one-year daily returns before the announcement. Beta is the OLS estimate from the market model using one-year daily returns before the announcement. Leverage is long and short-term debt over total assets. Market-tobook is the average price for the 60 trading-day period ending 7 days before announcement over book value per share from the most recent fiscal year-end. X60bef is the 60-day cumulative excess return ending 7 days before the announcement. Xret5) . Panel C provides estimates of the variance-covariance matrix for the two-equation system. Insider holdings is the proportion of shares held by officers, directors and large blockholders. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Leverage is short-and long-term debt over total assets. X60bef is the 60-day cumulative excess return ending 7 days before the announcement. Free cash flow is net income less dividends plus depreciation expressed as a percentage of total assets. Market-to-book is the average price for the 60 trading-day period ending 7 days before announcement over book value per share from the most recent fiscal year-end. Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of oneyear daily returns before the announcement. σ µε is the covariance of the error terms in the two-equation system. σ µµ is the variance of the error term in the abnormal announcement period return equation. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns of NCIB and Non-NCIB Firms
NCIB
Daily excess returns are daily returns less the TSE value-weighted market return. Daily average excess returns are accumulated over a period from 100 days before the announcement to 200 days after. The NCIB sample includes announcements made by TSE-listed firms during 1989-1992 and excludes announcements motivated to offset ESOPs. The non-NCIB sample includes a group of TSE-listed firms that did not make any normal course issuer bids during the same period. Each non-NCIB firm is assigned a fictitious announcement date. Uncertainty regarding earnings is resolved, i.e., nature reveals earnings to market with some probability.
Repurchase.
Firm pays out terminal cash flow.
